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DEFEATING TROLLS:  
THE IMPACT OF OCTANE AND HIGHMARK  
ON PATENT TROLLS 
Aria Soroudi* 
 
This Comment discusses two Supreme Court cases, Octane Fitness, 
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health 
Management Systems, Inc., and their impact on patent litigation involving 
patent trolls.  Prior to these cases, patent troll litigation was on a continual 
rise and Congress’s proposed measures were failing to curb the problem.  
Many companies, particularly startups, were left vulnerable to a patent troll 
threat because they could not afford the potential court costs to defend their 
case.  This problem was compounded by the fact that traditional attorney 
fee shifting awards were extremely rigid and difficult to prove.  This 
Comment argues that Octane and Highmark are able to hinder patent troll 
litigation because they reduce the standard by which attorney fees may be 
awarded to the prevailing party. 
Moreover, Octane and Highmark are better able to address this 
problem better than other proposed and implemented solutions such as 
Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank and the Innovation Act.  The argument is that 
Octane and Highmark allow an easier award of attorney fees while 
minimizing the adverse affects the other two alternatives carry.  Lastly, by 
implementing a mandatory bonding requirement on patent plaintiffs, the 
patent troll business model will be severely impacted and result in a decline 
in frivolous patent litigation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mention the word “troll” and what is the first thing that comes to 
mind?  For some, it may be images of a mythological creature that lives 
under bridges and scares small children.  For others however, like Google, 
Apple, and Intel, a particular type of troll—”a patent troll”—is the first to 
                                                          
*University of Southern California undergraduate and 2016 J.D. candidate at Loyola Law School, 
Los Angeles.  The author would like to thank Loyola Law School Professor Cindy Archer for 
her mentorship, guidance, and aid with this article, as well as the staff of the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their helpful comments and review. 
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come to mind.  Why is this the case?  These three companies have paid one 
of the most infamous patent trolls in the industry, Intellectual Ventures, a 
combined $6 billion in payouts and settlement fees.1  It is no wonder why 
venture capitalist and PayPal co-founder, Peter Theil, has called Intellectual 
Ventures a “parasitic tax on the tech industry.”2  Despite repeated efforts to 
curb patent trolls, the problem continues to worsen year after year.3 
On April 29, 2014, it became evident that the United States Supreme 
Court was ready to put a stop to this growing problem.4  Patent trolls, also 
known as non-practicing entities (“NPEs”)5, make the bulk of their money 
by holding patents solely to license and enforce them against alleged 
infringers.6  They bring suits against both large and small companies alike.7   
For young startups, however, an action brought by a patent troll can 
be devastating for the company.8  With tight budgets, these companies do 
                                                          
1.  Ashlee Vance, Silicon Valley’s Most Hated Patent Troll Stops Suing and Starts 
Making, BUS. WK. (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-09-
04/intellectual-ventures-patent-troll-funds-startups-new-products.   
 
2.  Id.  
 
3.  See, e.g., Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting 
Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 688 (2012) (“[O]ne of the purposes of the AIA, including 
the joinder provision, is to address the problem of patent trolls.”); James Bessen, Patent Trolling 
Was up 11 Percent Last Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/31/patent-trolling-was-up-11-
percent-last-year (“[In 2013], patent trolls filed 18 percent more lawsuits than in 2012, suing 11 
percent more companies.”). 
 
4.  See, e.g., Judith R. Blakeway, Patent Trolls Beware: Award of Attorney’s Fees to 
Prevailing Party in a Patent Case Can Be Reversed Only for Abuse of Discretion, STRASBURGER 
& PRICE, LLP INTELL. PROP. BLOG (May 14, 2014), http://www.strasburger.com/patent-trolls-
beware/.  
 
5.  Throughout this Note, the terms “patent troll” and “NPE” are used interchangeably.   
 
6.  Caroline Coker Coursey, Battling the Patent Troll: Tips for Defending Patent 
Infringement Claims by Non-Manufacturing Patentees, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 237, 237–38 
(2009) (citing Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911 (W.D. Wis. 
2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 726 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).  
 
7.  See, e.g., WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., PATENT TROLLS: PREDATORY LITIGATION AND 
THE SMOTHERING OF INNOVATION 11–13, 17 (2013) (discussing the most pursued companies by 
patent trolls and the impact of patent trolls on small businesses).   
 
8.  See John Villasenor, ‘Fee-Shifting’ and Patent Reform: A Double-Edged Sword for 
Startup Companies, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2013, 3:59 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2013/12/18/fee-shifting-and-patent-reform-a-double-
edged-sword-for-startup-companies/. 
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not have the money or the incentive to battle patent trolls in court because 
the fees themselves are enough to put the company out of business.9  Under 
the American rule, each party by default is responsible for paying its own 
attorney’s fees regardless of the outcome.10  In patent cases, only in 
“exceptional cases” do courts award reasonable attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party.11  Even then, this standard was so demanding that it 
rendered Section 285 of the Patent Act “largely superfluous.”12  However, 
this Comment argues that by properly shifting attorney fees upon the 
obstructive party, patent trolls will be forced to reevaluate their traditional 
business practices.  Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Octane Fitness, 
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (“Octane”) and Highmark, Inc. v. 
Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc. (“Highmark”) ultimately address 
this solution by lowering the burden for the award of attorney’s fees. 
Part II defines patent trolls and discusses their continual rise and the 
danger they pose on the economy.  Part II also discusses Congress’s failure 
to adequately address the patent troll problem.  Part III provides a summary 
and history of attorney’s fees under Section 285 of the Patent Act prior to 
the Supreme Court decisions in Octane and Highmark.  Subsequently, Part 
IV discusses and analyzes Octane, while Part V discusses and analyzes 
Highmark.  Part VI then addresses Highmark and Octane’s impact on 
patent trolls.  Part VII discusses the impact of other various legislative and 
Supreme Court solutions to address patent trolls while also proposing a 
third complimentary solution to Octane and Highmark.  Lastly, Part VIII 
provides a summary and conclusion of this Comment. 
II. ORIGINS OF THE PATENT TROLL 
A troll, a character from Norwegian folklore, is an odd name to 
characterize a company that buys and enforces patents.  Peter Detkin, while 
assistant general counsel for Intel Corporation, first coined the phrase 
“patent troll” for NPEs.13  According to Detkin, “a patent troll is somebody 
                                                          
9.  Id. 
 
10.  FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d). 
 
11.  Section 285 of the Patent Act governs attorney fees.  35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). 
 
12.  Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1752 (2014). 
 
13.  WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., PATENT TROLLS: PREDATORY LITIGATION AND THE 
SMOTHERING OF INNOVATION 11 (2013). 
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who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing 
and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced.”14  
The problem with this business model is that it undermines the purpose for 
granting patents, which is the development of new inventions.15 
The limited monopoly of patents, in turn, “provides inventors with an 
incentive to . . . invent, disclose, and commercialize.”16  The most 
important of these incentives is the incentive to invent.17  A limited 
monopoly on an invention allows inventors to use their monopoly “to 
charge a price that more closely approaches the value that users get from 
the inventions.”18  Therefore, investors are able to recover their investment, 
which ultimately provides the motivation to invent.19  Moreover, patents 
incentivize inventors to commercialize the product.20  The patent gives the 
inventor time to attain commercial viability for the products, allowing the 
patent investors to recoup their investment.21 
The Founding Fathers also understood the importance of protecting 
intellectual property by including Article I, Section 8 in the United States 
Constitution, which states, “Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the 
                                                          
14.  Id. (citing Anna Mayergoyz, Lesson from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls, 
42 CORNELL INT’L L.J., 241, 245 (2009)). 
 
15.  See Brief of Apple Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 15, Highmark 
Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (No. 12-1163), 2013 WL 
6492296, at *15 (citing Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883)) (“The design of the 
patent laws is to reward those who make some substantial discovery or invention, which adds to 
our knowledge and makes a step in advance in the useful arts.”). 
 
16.  Tina M. Nguyen, Note, Lowering the Fare: Reducing the Patent Troll’s Ability to Tax 
the Patent System, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 101, 110 (2012) (citing MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. 
RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 28, 30, 33–34 (3d ed. 
2009)). 
 
17.  Id. at 111. 
 
18.  Id. (citing William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent 
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 269 (1966); John S. McGee, Patent 
Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J.L. & ECON. 135, 137–39 (1966)). 
 
19.  Nguyen, supra note 16, at 111. 
 
20.  Id. (citing MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER, & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 28, 33 (3d ed. 2009)). 
 
21.  Id. at 112 (citing MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 28, 34 (3d ed. 2009)). 
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Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”22  Patent trolls, however, undermine patent policy goals 
because they “extract all of the rights from a patent without conferring 
upon society any of the benefits.”23 
A.  How Patent Trolls Work 
Patent trolls often acquire their patents from technology companies 
that failed.24  When a company files for bankruptcy, its patent portfolio is 
sold in bankruptcy auctions,25 allowing patent trolls to accumulate massive 
portfolios.26  Additionally, patent trolls buy patents from independent 
inventors or, alternatively, search the country for patents on older 
technology that might be used in modern products.27  Once acquired, patent 
trolls do not produce products, but rather, identify companies in the same 
industries and attempt to collect license fees or sue them for infringement.28 
What makes patent trolls extremely problematic in court is their 
leverage over other product-producing companies.29  When NPEs file a 
suit, they cannot in turn be countersued for patent infringement because 
they are not producing an actual product with the patent they acquired.30  
Moreover, because patent trolls do not use patented inventions themselves, 
the parties cannot settle with a cross-licensing agreement, which is a 
common way patent infringement suits are settled between entities that use 
                                                          
22.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 
23.  Watkins, supra note 13 (citing Victoria E. Luxardo, Comment, Towards a Solution to 
the Problem of Illegitimate Patent Enforcement Practices in the United States: An Equitable 
Affirmative Defense of “Fair Use” in Patent, 20 EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 791, 796 (2006)). 
 
24.  Id. at 13. 
 
25.  Id. 
 
26.  Id. 
 
27.  Id. 
 
28.  Id. 
 
29.  Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 691 (2012). 
 
30.  Id. 
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patented inventions.31  This allows patent trolls to bring claims without fear 
of severe backlash. 
One need not look further than NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd. 
to understand the damage that patent trolls can inflict.32  NTP is a NPE, 
which owns about twenty-five patents.33  In 2001, NTP filed suit against 
Research in Motion (“RIM”) alleging RIM infringed on NTP patents.34  
RIM defended its suit on the theory that NTP’s patents were too obvious to 
be patentable.35  The case went to trial and the jury returned a verdict for 
NTP, awarding NTP $53 million.36  The court also granted a permanent 
injunction against RIM, which prohibited RIM from manufacturing and 
selling Blackberry devices.37  RIM appealed and the injunction was stayed 
pending the decision.38  While on appeal, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) reexamined NTP’s patents to determine 
whether they were valid.39  Eventually, the USPTO found all of NTP’s 
patents were invalid.40  NTP appealed the decision of the USPTO, further 
delaying the injunction pending against RIM.41  With the threat of an 
injunction still looming, RIM decided to settle with NTP for $612.5 
million.42  Ultimately the patents were held invalid, but not after RIM paid 
half a billion dollars in licensing fees.43 
                                                          
31.  Id. 
 
32.  See generally NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 
33.  Watkins, supra note 13, at 21. 
 
34.  NTP, 418 F.3d at 1290. 
 
35.  Id. at 1325. 
 
36.  Id. at 1292. 
 
37.  Id. 
 
38.  Id. 
 
39.  Nguyen, supra note 16, at 107. 
 
40.  Id. 
 
41.  Id. 
 
42.  Id. 
 
43.  Id. 
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Although this case was in 2001, patent infringement lawsuits 
involving NPEs have “increased dramatically over the last decade, by an 
average of 22% per year since 2004.”44  Just two years ago, “patent trolls 
filed 18% more lawsuits in 2013 than in 2012, suing 11% more 
companies.”45  Of all patent lawsuits filed in 2013, approximately 52% 
involved patent trolls.46 
B.  Major Causes of Patent Trolling 
In part, the rise in NPE litigation has resulted from the USPTO itself.  
In recent decades, the USPTO funding has been slashed, which has led to a 
diminished examination of patent applications.47  For instance, “[b]etween 
‘1983 to 2003, the number of patent applications received by the USPTO 
more than tripled . . . [while] the number of examiners . . . decreased by 
20%.’”48  As a result, the USPTO approves “thousands of ambiguous [and 
overbroad] patents . . . every year.”49  These overbroad patents make it 
difficult for product-producing companies to determine whether a patent’s 
claims will be invalidated in litigation.50 
Despite the USPTO’s faults, patent trolls are most able to thrive due 
to the cost of litigation.  The average legal cost to defend a patent suit 
ranges from “$420,000 for small and medium-sized companies to $1.52 
                                                          
44.  Litigations Over Time, PATENT FREEDOM, https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-
npes/litigations/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2015) (emphasis added). 
 
45.  James Bessen, Patent Trolling Was Up 11 Percent Last Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/31/patent-trolling-was-up-
11-percent-last-year.   
 
46.  Id.   
 
47.  Ashley Chuang, Note, Fixing the Failures of Software Patent Protection: Deterring 
Patent Trolling by Applying Industry-Specific Patentability Standards, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
215, 227 (2006). 
 
48.  Id. at 227–28 (“In 2004, nearly 118,000 patent applications previously reviewed by 
the USPTO were resubmitted as new applications with only minor changes, thus ‘wast[ing] the 
limited time examiners have to review an application and prevent[ing] examiners from focusing 
on the most important issues in an application.’  Further, of the 355,000 new applications filed in 
2004, over forty percent of them had more than twenty claims each.”). 
 
49.  Id. at 228 (“[O]n appeal, examiner decisions are commonly reversed and 
overturned.”). 
 
50.  Id. 
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million for large companies.”51  Because many small companies have no 
other business alternatives and cannot afford the risks and costs of 
litigation, they are forced to settle for needless licenses.52  Patent trolls 
know this and exploit these small companies for a quick profit. 
C.  The Dangers of Patent Trolls 
Some see the rise in patent litigation involving patent trolls as 
beneficial, contending that trolls fight large companies otherwise held 
unaccountable for infringement due to smaller companies’ inability to 
afford the costs of going to court.53  “Trolls fight for the rights of the little 
guy . . . [b]y purchasing the patent [and] infus[ing] capital into small 
business that can in turn focus on more R&D.  NPEs assume the risk of 
enforcing patents, and inventors can focus on inventing.”54 
While patent trolls may partly inject capital into small businesses, 
they also exact a severe toll on the economy and innovation.  It is estimated 
that from 1990 through October 2010, “NPE lawsuits ‘[were] responsible 
for over half a trillion dollars in lost wealth.’”55  This loss even caught the 
attention of President Obama, and the White House’s Council of Economic 
Advisors released a report, “Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation,” finding 
that defendants and licensees paid patent trolls “$29 billion in 2011, a 
400% increase from 2005.”56  The report further “estimated that less than 
25% of this money flowed back to innovation.”57  From 2007 through 
October 2010, patent lawsuits reduced the capitalization of targeted firms 
by an estimated $83 billion per year, which is equal to more than one-
                                                          
51.  James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 400 (2014). 
 
52.  Matthew Shay, Time to Demand an End to Abusive Patent Troll Tactics, THE HILL 
(Nov. 20, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/190779-time-
to-demand-an-end-to-abusive-patent-troll-tactics.  
 
53.  Watkins, supra note 13, at 16. 
 
54.  Id. 
 
55.  Id. 
 
56.  EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 9 
(2013), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.  
 
57.  Id. at 9. 
 
DEFEATING TROLLS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2015  2:08 PM 
2015] DEFEATING TROLLS 327 
quarter of U.S. industrial research and development spending per year.58  
This lost wealth results in less spending on innovative technology for 
companies at the forefront of technological innovation. 
The damage to small startups, however, is even more severe.  The 
White House Report found that “[i]n a recent survey of 223 technology 
company startups, 40 percent of [patent assertion entity]-targeted 
companies reported a ‘significant’ operational impact (e.g. change in 
business, delay in milestone, change in product, etc.) due to the suit or 
threat thereof,”59 and 13% were forced to exit the business or pivot their 
business strategy.60 
There are also social costs to patent troll litigation.  With over half of 
patent litigation brought by patent trolls, it could clog up already busy 
courtrooms and use resources that could be used for other cases.  Where 
product-producing companies that bring patent infringement suits win 40% 
of their cases, patent trolls win only 8% of their suits.61  Therefore, patent 
trolls exhaust more patent litigation resources while proving to be less 
successful than product-producing entities.62  This comes at the cost of the 
taxpayers because their tax dollars are spent to support the court’s 
resources.63 
D.  Congress’s Failed Solutions to Curb Patent Trolls 
With the rise of patent litigation, Congress started to take notice.  In 
2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act.64  The Act was predicted 
to curb the patent troll problem by limiting joinder of multiple defendants 
in patent litigation.65  However, with patent litigation involving patent trolls 
                                                          
58.  Watkins, supra note 13, at 17. 
 
59.  EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 56, at 10. 
 
60.  Id. at 11. 
 
61.  Bryant, supra note 29, at 693. 
 
62.  Id. 
 
63.  See id. at 688. 
 
64.  See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011). 
 
65.  Bryant, supra note 29, at 689 (“[T]he purpose of the [act] was to abrogate case law 
that allowed joinder of defendants simply because the plaintiff claimed that they had infringed the 
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still on the rise,66 it was apparent that further measures were needed. 
Over the course of two years, the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
pushed Congress to make reforms to reign in patent trolls.67  Congress 
finally responded in 2012 when Congressman Peter DeFazio introduced the 
SHIELD Act in the House of Representatives.68  The act involved shifting 
attorney’s fees in “computer hardware and software” patents where the 
patentee “did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding.”69  Although 
the SHIELD Act of 2012 failed to pass, it was reworked and re-introduced 
as the SHIELD Act of 2013.70  The SHIELD Act of 2013 attempted to 
“[shift] fees against any party that is not: (1) the original inventor or 
assignee; (2) exploiting the patent commercially through sale or production 
of items practicing the patent; or (3) a university or technology transfer 
organization.”71 
The Act raises an issue, however, because courts may find it difficult 
to assess whether the losing party falls into the “exploitation of the patent” 
category.72  By presumptively shifting fees to the losing party, there is no 
determination as to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.73  Therefore, the Act 
essentially presumes that the losing party’s claim is frivolous.  This may in 
turn deter small companies from filing legitimate claims.  Therefore, 
Congress’s proposed SHIELD Act does not seem to properly remedy 
patent litigation abuse. 
Another bill, known as the Innovation Act, seemed to show more 
                                                          
same patent.”). 
 
66.  Id. at 687. 
 
67.  Daniel Nazer, Patent Reform Stalls in Congress As Trolls Roll On, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (May 15, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/patent-reform-stalls-congress-
trolls-roll. 
 
68.  Id. 
 
69.  Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
59, 109 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
70.  Id. at 112. 
 
71.  Id. 
 
72.  Emily H. Chen, Making Abusers Pay: Deterring Patent Litigation by Shifting 
Attorneys' Fees, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 351, 377 (2013). 
 
73.  See id. 
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promise.  Much like the SHIELD Act, the Innovation Act seeks to reduce 
the cost and frequency of patent litigation by shifting fees.74  However, the 
Innovation Act awards attorney’s fees to the losing party by default.75  The 
House of Representatives passed the Innovation Act in December 2013 by 
a staggering margin of 325 to 91, showing apparent signs of progress.76  In 
May 2014, however, the Innovation Act was dealt a crucial blow.77  
Senator Patrick Leahy pulled it from the Judiciary Committee agenda, 
stating that “competing companies on both sides of [the] issue refused to 
come to agreement.”78  The bill has been repeatedly postponed,79 and it 
seems Congress has failed once again to curb the problem. 
III.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE PATENT ACT’S FEE SHIFTING PROVISION 
The Patent Act of 1952 is the current law governing patents in the 
United States.80  The Act provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent.”81  To 
obtain a patent, an inventor must submit an application to the USPTO.82  
An examiner approves and issues a patent, which generally remains valid 
for twenty years.83  Prior to 1946, the Patent Act did not authorize the 
                                                          
74.  Liang & Berliner, supra note 69, at 124. 
 
75.  Michael Rosen, Thwarting ‘Patent Trolls’: Not as Easy as It Sounds, AM. ENTER. 
INST. (June 10, 2014, 8:53 AM), http://www.aei.org/publication/thwarting-patent-trolls-not-as-
easy-as-it-sounds/print/. 
 
76.  Klint Finley, U.S. Senate Drives a Stake Through Heart of Patent Reform, WIRED 
(May 21, 2014, 8:53 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/05/rip-innovation-act/. 
 
77.  Kelly Servick, U.S. Senate Shelves Long-Debated ‘Patent Troll’ Bill, SCI. MAG. (May 
22, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/policy/2014/05/u.s.-senate-shelves-long-debated-
patent-troll-bill. 
 
78.  Id. 
 
79.  Id. 
 
80.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 
81.  Id. 
 
82.  General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-
getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents (last visited Mar. 29, 2015). 
 
83.  Id. 
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awarding of attorney’s fees under any circumstances.84  Instead, the Act 
followed the default American Rule under which both sides must bear its 
own attorney’s fees.85 
In 1946, Congress introduced a discretionary fee-shifting provision, 
which stated that a court, “may in its discretion award reasonable attorney’s 
fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment on any patent 
case.”86  In granting this power, the legislature made clear that the court 
should not award fees in patent cases as a matter of course.87  The payment 
of attorney’s fees was not seen as a penalty for failure to win, but rather, 
“was designed to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged infringer.”88  Also, 
“fraud practiced on the Patent Office or vexatious or unjustified litigation 
are adequate justification for awarding attorneys’ fees.”89 
In 1952, Congress re-codified the fee-shifting provision under the 
current Section 285.90  The revised provision provides:  “[t]he court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party.”91  Although Section 285 introduced the words “exceptional 
cases,”92 the revised language was “for purposes of clarification only.”93  
As such, the courts continued to apply the fee-shifting provision in a 
discretionary manner, looking at the totality of the circumstances.94 
Courts used several factors to determine whether a given case was 
                                                          
84.  Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2014). 
 
85.  Id. 
 
86.  35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946). 
 
87.  Pa. Crusher Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 193 F.2d 445, 450-51 (3d Cir. 1951). 
 
88.  Id. at 451. 
 
89.  Id. 
 
90.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 
91.  35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952) (emphasis added). 
 
92.  See S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2423 (“This 
section is substantially the same as the corresponding provision in R.S. 4921; ‘in exceptional 
cases’ has been added as expressing the intention of the present statute as shown by its legislative 
history and as interpreted by the courts.”). 
 
93.  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653 n.8 (1983). 
 
94.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1753. 
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sufficiently “exceptional” to warrant attorney fees.95  One such factor was 
the plaintiff’s motive in bringing the patent suit.96  Therefore, if the 
plaintiff was aware that the patent was invalid at the time of the suit, then 
the court may deem the case exceptional.97  Another factor was whether the 
tactics employed by the plaintiff in maintaining his suit justify an award of 
attorney fees.98  For example, if the litigation is needlessly protracted, it 
may be deemed exceptional.99  The most important factor, this Comment 
argues, is the patentee’s conduct in originally obtaining his patent, “since 
fraud on the Patent Office in that endeavor is enough itself to make a case 
exceptional.”100  In Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chemical Co., the court explained that: 
 
Such conduct is a serious breach of the patentee’s duty to 
the Patent Office. The party who succeeds in invalidating 
the unlawful patent performs a valuable public service.  It 
is appropriate under such circumstances to reward the 
prevailing party by giving him attorney’s fees for his 
efforts, and it is equally appropriate to penalize in the same 
measure the patentee who obtained the patent by his 
wrongdoing.101 
 
In 1982, Congress vested the United States Court of Appeals for the 
                                                          
95.  True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 508 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 
96.  Id. 
 
97.  Id. 
 
98.  Id. 
 
99.  Id. 
 
100.  Id. 
 
101.  Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288, 
294 (9th Cir. 1969) (citations omitted) (“The District Court found that Monolith had made 
fraudulent representations to the Patent Office in four respects: (1) deliberate concealment of 
statutory bars; (2) falsehoods in a petition to make special; (3) misrepresentations about 
‘unexpected results’; and (4) false statements of novelty in an affidavit by one Oscar Wicken 
procured by Monolith and filed in the Patent Office. Monolith argues that each of those findings 
is clearly erroneous. We examine the findings seriatim.”). 
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Federal Circuit with sole appellate jurisdiction over patent cases.102  Like 
the regional courts before, the Federal Circuit continued to consider the 
totality of the circumstances and various factors to assess whether a patent 
case was exceptional.103 
In 2005, however, the Federal Circuit, in Brooks Furniture 
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc. unexpectedly 
abandoned this discretionary and “equitable approach.”104  The court in 
Brooks held that a case is exceptional under Section 285 only “when there 
has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter in 
litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in 
procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified 
litigation, conduct that violates [Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure], or like infractions.”105  Additionally, “[a]bsent misconduct in 
conduct of the litigation or in securing the patent, sanctions may be 
imposed against the patentee only if both (1) the litigation is brought in 
subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.”106  
Further, the court in Brooks held “[t]here is a presumption that the assertion 
of infringement of a duly granted patent is made in good faith”107 and the 
“underlying improper conduct and the characterization of the case as 
exceptional must be established by clear and convincing evidence.”108 
Expanding on the issue, the Federal Circuit in iLOR, LLC v. Google, 
Inc. made clear that litigation is objectively baseless if it is “so 
unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed.”109  
                                                          
102.   Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754. 
 
103.  Id.; see also Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In assessing whether a case qualifies as exceptional, the district court 
must look at the totality of the circumstances.”). 
 
104.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754 (citing Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 
393 F.3d 1378, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 
105.  Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 
106.  Id. 
 
107.  Id. at 1382. 
 
108.  Id. 
 
109.  iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
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It comes as no coincidence that following the decision in Brooks, the 
number of frivolous patent suits brought by patent trolls has risen 
astronomically.110  However, two Supreme Court cases, Highmark and 
Octane, have set out to slay patent trolls once and for all. 
IV.  OCTANE FITNESS, LLC V. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS 
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (“ICON”) is a manufacturer of exercise 
equipment and owns U.S Patent No. 6,019,710 (“Patent 710”) for an 
elliptical exercise machine.111  Although ICON owns Patent 710, it never 
produced or commercially sold the design.112  The defendant, Octane 
Fitness, LLC, (“Octane”) is also a manufacturer of exercise equipment and 
commercially sells two elliptical machines known as the Q45 and Q47.113  
In 2011, ICON sued Octane, alleging that Octane’s Q45 and Q47 elliptical 
machines infringed on Patent 710.114  Octane denied the infringement and 
moved for summary judgment declaring non-infringement.115  The district 
court granted Octane’s motion, concluding that the Q45 and Q47 elliptical 
machines did not infringe on ICON’s Patent 710.116  Octane then moved for 
attorney’s fees under Section 285 arguing that ICON’s “unreasonable claim 
construction positions,” and its “privilege assertions over its pre-suit 
investigation” were made in bad faith.117  Further, during discovery, Octane 
                                                          
110.  Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al. in Support of Pet’r at 10, 
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184), 2013 
WL 6512960, at *10 (“PAEs accounted for only about five percent of patent litigation in 2000-
2002 . . . This figure increased to about 22 percent in 2007, and then to almost 40 percent in 
2011.”). 
 
111.   Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1754 (2014) 
(“[t]he respondent, ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., owns U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710 ([]710 patent), 
which discloses an elliptical exercise machine that allows for adjustments to fit the individual 
stride paths of users.”). 
 
112.  Id. at 1755. 
 
113.  Id. 
 
114.  Id. 
 
115.  Id. 
 
116.  Id. 
 
117.  ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App’x. 57, 65 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
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obtained emails from ICON’s Vice President of Global Sales that were sent 
to two other employees, stating “[the] old patent we had for a long time that 
was sitting on the shelf.118  [We] are just looking for royalties.”119  The “old 
patent” from the email referred to Patent 710.120  However, the district 
court denied Octane’s motion, determining that “Octane could show neither 
that ICON’s claim was objectively baseless nor that ICON had brought it in 
subjective bad faith.”121  Furthermore, “[t]he fact that [ICON] is a bigger 
company which never commercialized [Patent 710], and [this was] an e-
mail exchange between two ICON sales executives,” was insufficient to 
show that ICON brought the suit in bad faith.122 
ICON appealed the non-infringement judgment and Octane cross-
appealed the denial of Section 285 attorney fees.123  Specifically, Octane 
argued that the Brooks standard was “overly restrictive” in finding a case 
exceptional under Section 285.124  However, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
both district court orders and declined to “revisit the settled standard for 
exceptionality.”125  Octane again appealed and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.126  After almost seven months, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Federal Circuit decision and overturned the framework established by 
Brooks, finding that Brooks was “unduly rigid, and it impermissibly 
                                                          
118.  ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, No. 09-319 ADM/SER, 2011 
WL 3900975, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2011) (“[A]n Icon employee with the title of Vice 
President of Global Sales reported to two other employees, ‘We are suing Octane.  Not only are 
we coming out with a great product to go after them, but throwing a lawsuit on top of that.’”). 
 
119.  Id.  
 
120.  See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754.  
 
121.  Id. at 1755. 
 
122.  Id. (quoting ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, No. 09-319 
ADM/SER, 2011 WL 3900975, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2011)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
123.  Id. 
 
124.  Id. (quoting ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App’x. 57, 
67 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
125.  Id. (quoting ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App’x. 57, 
67 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
126.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1755. 
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encumber[ed] the statutory grant of discretion to district courts.”127  In its 
place, the Supreme Court held “[d]istrict courts may determine whether a 
case is exceptional in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, 
considering the totality of the circumstances.”128  Moreover, “[a]s in the 
comparable context of the Copyright Act, there is no precise rule or 
formula for making these determinations, but instead equitable discretion 
should be exercised in light of the considerations.”129 
The Court’s reasoning behind this change started with an analysis of 
the text of Section 285 itself.130  Because the Patent Act did not define the 
term “exceptional,” the Court construed it in “accordance with [its] 
ordinary meaning.”131  As such, the Supreme Court took “exceptional” to 
mean “uncommon, rare, or not ordinary.”132  Therefore, the Supreme Court 
held that an exceptional case is “simply one that stands out from others 
with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position 
(considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the 
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.”133 
Another reason for the change in the rule was partly because the 
Brooks standard “superimpose[d] an inflexible framework onto statutory 
text that [was] inherently flexible.”134  Previously, courts applying the 
Brooks standard would allow attorney’s fees where the litigation 
misconduct was independently sanctionable or the litigation was both 
objectively baseless and brought in subjective bad faith.135  The Court in 
                                                          
127.  Id. 
 
128.  Id. at 1756. 
 
129.  Id. (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
130.  Id. at 1755. 
 
131.  Id. at 1756 (quoting Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013)); see also Bilski 
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“In patent law, as in 
all statutory construction, [u]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”). 
 
132.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 889 (2d ed. 
1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
133.  Id. 
 
134.  Id. 
 
135.  Id. at 1756–57. 
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Octane, however, made clear that a party’s unreasonable conduct, although 
not independently sanctionable, can still justify an award of attorney 
fees.136  Moreover, the requirement that the litigation be both objectively 
baseless and brought in subjective bad faith was not Congress’ intent when 
it drafted the “exceptional” language.137  Rather, “a case presenting either 
subjective bad faith or exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently . . . 
warrant a fee award.”138 
In its brief to the Supreme Court, ICON argued that the Brooks 
standard was properly adopted in another Supreme Court decision, 
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 
Inc. (hereinafter “PRE”).139  In PRE, the Court considered when the First 
Amendment provides immunity from antitrust liability for litigation 
activity.140  The Court held “the plaintiff must have brought baseless claims 
in an attempt to thwart competition (i.e., in bad faith).”141  The Supreme 
Court in Octane, however, found that the adoption of the PRE standard in 
Brooks made little sense in the context of Section 285 fee awards.142  The 
Court in PRE “carved out . . . a narrow exception . . . to avoid chilling the 
exercise of the First Amendment right to petition the government for the 
redress of grievances.”143  The PRE court’s “demanding standard reflects 
both the important First Amendment interests at stake in petitioning the 
government . . . and the distinct chilling effect of treble damages.”144  
                                                          
136.  Id. 
 
137.  See id. at 1757. 
 
138.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757. 
 
139.  Id. 
 
140.  See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 
56 (1993). 
 
141.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757; see also id. at 60–61(internal quotation marks omitted) 
(holding that to qualify as a “sham” a “lawsuit must be objectively baseless” and must conceal 
“an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor”). 
 
142.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757. 
 
143.  Id. 
 
144.  Brief for Google, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 12, 
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (No. 12-1163), Octane 
Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2014) (No. 12-1184), 2013 
WL 6492299. 
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However, Section 285 of the Patent Act does not raise any of these First 
Amendment concerns.145  Therefore, narrowly construing the shifting of 
attorney’s fees in Brooks was improper.146 
Another reason for the Court’s rejection of Brooks was that it 
rendered Section 285 “largely superfluous.”147  The courts have recognized 
that litigating in bad faith is a sufficient basis for awarding attorney’s fees 
under the common law.148  This common law rule existed, as it does today, 
at the time Congress enacted Section 285.149  Therefore, if Brooks were 
correct and Section 285 required a subjective bad faith showing, Section 
285 “would have had no effect: fee-shifting would be limited to the same 
category of cases in which it was available before the statute was 
enacted.”150 
Lastly, the Supreme Court in Octane rejected the Brooks standard 
because of the requirement that entitlement to fees under Section 285 be 
established by clear and convincing evidence.151  At no time before Brooks 
did the Supreme Court require entitlement to fees by clear and convincing 
evidence.152  Rather, “patent-infringement litigation ha[d] always been 
                                                          
145.  See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757; see also Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. 
Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 373 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the argument that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine places limits on fee-shifting). 
 
146.  See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, et al. in Support of Pet’r at 10, Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184), 2013 WL 6512960, at *7. 
 
147.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758; see also Brief of Pet’r at 7, Octane, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (No. 
12-1184) (“[T]he Federal Circuit's interpretation also makes it superfluous.”). 
 
148.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“We have long 
recognized a common-law exception to the general American rule against fee-shifting—an 
exception . . . that applies for willful disobedience of a court order or when the losing party has 
acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . . .”). 
 
149.  Brief of BSA | The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
14, Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184), 
2013 WL 6492300, at *14. 
 
150.  Id. at 14–15; see also Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (“We have twice declined to 
construe fee-shifting provisions narrowly on the basis that doing so would render them 
superfluous, given the background exception to the American rule . . . .”). 
 
151.  Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758. 
 
152.  Id.  
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governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard.”153  For the 
foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court rejected Brooks and re-established 
the long held standard of totality of the circumstances when determining 
attorney fees.154 
V.  HIGHMARK INC. V.  
ALLCARE HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC. 
Allcare is a Virginia-based company that licenses intellectual property 
assets.155  Among its assets is U.S. Patent No. 5,301,105 (“105 patent”), 
which covers “utilization review in managed health care systems.”156  Like 
other patent trolls, Allcare conducted a survey of various healthcare 
management and insurance companies in order to find potential targets to 
collect fees.157  From this survey, Allcare filed suit against twenty-four 
companies, including Highmark, claiming that the companies’ management 
systems infringed the 105 patent.158  In April 2002, Allcare sent Highmark 
a letter demanding that Highmark purchase a license to the 105 patent or 
else face potential litigation.159  Allcare then sent additional letters to 
Highmark, threatening litigation and warning Highmark of the high costs of 
litigation.160 
After failed discussions between the parties, Highmark filed suit 
against Allcare seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, 
invalidity, and unenforceability of all claims of the 105 patent.161  Allcare 
                                                          
153.  Id.  
 
154.  See generally Octane, 134 S. Ct. 1749. 
 
155.  Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 713, 716 (N.D. 
Tex. 2010). 
 
156.  Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2014) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
157.  Highmark, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 716. 
 
158.  Id. 
 
159.  Id. 
 
160.  Id. 
 
161.  Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1747. 
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counterclaimed for patent infringement.162  Both Highmark and Allcare 
then moved for summary judgment.163  The district court granted summary 
judgment of non-infringement in favor of Highmark, and Allcare 
appealed.164  While the appeal was pending, Highmark moved for 
attorney’s fees under Section 285.165  The district court granted Highmark’s 
Section 285 motion, finding that Allcare “engaged in a pattern of 
‘vexatious’ and ‘deceitful’ conduct throughout the litigation.”166  
Particularly, the district court found that “Allcare had ‘pursued [the] suit as 
part of a bigger plan to identify companies potentially infringing the 105 
patent . . . and then to force those companies to purchase a license of the 
105 patent under threat of litigation.’”167  Moreover, “Allcare had 
‘maintained infringement claims [against Highmark] well after such claims 
had been shown by its own experts to be without merit’ and had ‘asserted 
defenses it and its attorneys knew to be frivolous.’”168 
On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
reversed in part and affirmed in part.169  The court affirmed “the 
exceptional-case determination with respect to the allegations that 
Highmark’s system infringed one claim of the 105 patent, but reversed the 
determination with respect to another claim of the patent.”170  The court 
then reviewed the district court’s determination de novo171 and held that 
“because the question whether litigation is ‘objectively baseless’ under 
Brooks . . . ‘is a question of law based on underlying mixed questions of 
law and fact,’ an objective-baselessness determination is reviewed on 
                                                          
162.  Id. 
 
163.  Id. 
 
164.  Id. 
 
165.  Id. 
 
166.  Id. 
 
167.  Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1747. 
 
168.  Id. 
 
169.  Id. 
 
170.  Id. 
 
171.  Id. 
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appeal ‘de novo’ and ‘without deference.’”172  It then determined that 
Allcare’s claim was “not so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could 
believe it would succeed,” and therefore held that none of Allcare’s 
conduct warranted Section 285 attorney’s fees under Brooks.173  Judge 
Mayer, however, dissented to the court’s decision to adopt a “de novo” 
standard.174  Despite the dissent of five judges, the Federal Circuit denied a 
rehearing en banc.175  The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari.176 
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal 
Circuit’s decision, holding that “an appellate court should apply an abuse 
of discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s Section 
285 determination.”177  The Court reasoned that “decisions on ‘questions of 
law’ are ‘reviewable de novo,’ decisions on ‘questions of fact’ are 
‘reviewable for clear error,’ and decisions on ‘matters of discretion’ are 
‘reviewable for abuse of discretion.’”178  Because the district’s court’s 
determination to award Section 285 attorney’s fees was a matter of 
discretion, it should have been reviewed only for abuse of discretion.179 
 
VI.  THE IMPACT OF HIGHMARK AND OCTANE 
 
After the decisions in Highmark and Octane, many commentators 
wonder about their immediate impacts and consequences in the patent 
                                                          
172.  Id. 
 
173.  Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1747–48.  
 
174.  Id. (Judge Mayer dissented in part, disagreeing with the view “‘that no deference is 
owed to a district court’s finding that the infringement claims asserted by a litigant at trial were 
objectively unreasonable.’”). 
 
175.  Id. at 1748. 
 
176.  See id. 
 
177.  Id. at 1749. 
 
178.  Id. at 1748; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-60 (1988) (“We 
recently observed, with regard to the problem of determining whether mixed questions of law and 
fact are to be treated as questions of law or of fact for purposes of appellate review, that 
sometimes the decision ‘has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound 
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in 
question.’”) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
 
179.  See Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1748.  
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field.180  Standing together, it is clear the decisions make it easier for 
district court judges to award attorney’s fees in patent cases.181  In Octane, 
the standard for Section 285 attorney’s fees was restored to its original, 
intended standard, making it easier for courts to weed out frivolous cases 
brought by patent trolls.182  Moreover, the decision in Highmark places 
patent law more in sync with other areas of law.183  The Federal Circuit will 
now be required to allow the district court’s decision to stand unless it is 
shown on appeal that the district court judge abused his or her discretion.  
This is a high standard that will typically prevent the Federal Circuit from 
reversing the district court’s decision in most cases.184  Ultimately, with 
lowered standards, patent trolls will now have to think twice before 
bringing a costly infringement suit against innovative companies, knowing 
they may have to pay the attorney’s fees. 
The impact of Octane and Highmark are already being felt.  Just one 
month after the rulings in Octane and Highmark, the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York awarded attorney fees to 
FindTheBest.com (“FTB”) in a prolonged suit with Lumen View 
Technology.185  Judge Cote, who oversaw the trial, explained that 
“Lumen’s motivation . . . was to extract a nuisance settlement . . . from 
FTB on the theory that FTB would rather pay an unjustified license fee 
than bear the costs of the threatened expensive litigation.”186  On these 
grounds, Section 285 attorney’s fees were justified.187  Moreover, since the 
                                                          
180.  See generally Rich Steeves, Octane, Highmark Cases to Impact Future of Fee 
Shifting, INSIDE COUNSEL (May 1, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/05/01/octane-
highmark-cases-to-impact-future-of-fee-shif (asking the practical impact of Highmark Inc. v. 
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) to fee shifting in patent cases). 
 
181.  Id.  
 
182.  See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014). 
 
183.  See generally Judith R. Blakeway, Patent Trolls Beware, STRASBURGER BLOGS 
(May 14, 2014), http://www.strasburger.com/patent-trolls-beware (demonstrating that courts have 
become more in sync with each other in terms of patent standards of review). 
 
184.  See id. 
 
185.  John F. O’Rourke, Patrick Soon & Rebecca Bellow, Silver, Garlic, and Attorney’s 
Fees, ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER (Oct. 2014), available at 
http://www.whglawfirm.com/SILVER-GARLIC-AND-ATTORNEY-S-FEES.pdf. 
 
186.  Id.  
 
187.  Id.  
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decisions, 101 district courts have cited Octane.188  This is a testament to 
the impact these two Supreme Court decisions are making in patent law. 
Highmark and Octane are not only impacting the patent world, but are 
impacting trademark law as well.189  In a Third Circuit case, Fair Wind 
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, the court determined that Octane’s ruling on 
awarding attorney’s fees in patent cases should apply equally to trademark 
cases under the Lanham Act.190  Traditionally, the Third Circuit has utilized 
a two-step approach, much like the Brooks standard, that required (1) a 
finding of culpable conduct, and (2) an assessment that that conduct is 
extraordinary before assessing attorney’s fees in trademark suits.191  In 
holding that the test no longer applies, the Third Circuit noted the Supreme 
Court “was sending a clear message that it was defining ‘exceptional’ not 
just for the fee provision in the Patent Act, but for the fee provision in the 
Lanham Act as well.”192  Not only is the language in the Lanham Act’s 
attorney’s fee provision very similar to that in Section 285, the Supreme 
Court in Octane cited a Lanham Act case when defining “exceptional.”193 
 Despite the visible impact of these cases in the patent field, many 
doubt whether Highmark and Octane will actually be the dagger in the 
heart for patent trolls.194  One such argument contends that Highmark and 
Octane will not likely impact patent trolls because the “business model for 
many trolls is only based on threatening to bring lawsuits as a tactic for 
forcing settlements rather than actually bringing law suits.”195  Given that 
attorney’s fees are not awarded when a matter is settled, patent trolls will 
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continue to exploit small and large companies alike.196  This argument has 
its merits given that 97% of patent claims settle before they even reach 
trial.197  However, this argument fails to take into account the inherent 
business model of these patent trolls, which is to threaten costly litigation 
knowing that settling is a cheaper option than paying attorney’s fees.198  
With the decisions in Highmark and Octane, the patent troll business model 
has changed because product-producing companies now know that the 
other side will likely bear the cost of their attorney fees.199  With this 
knowledge, companies will have the confidence to stand up to patent trolls 
and not compromise on settlements. 
Lumen View Technology, LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc. is the perfect 
example.200  There, the company’s CEO, Kevin O’Connor, vowed to fight 
back rather than pay the $50,000 licensing fee Lumen (the NPE) was 
demanding.201  The company quickly defeated the claim in court and FTB 
was awarded $200,000 in attorney fees.202  O’Connor said he hoped “other 
companies [will] see this as a sign that settling isn’t the only way out.”203 
Ultimately, empirical evidence supports the proposition that 
Highmark and Octane are starting to curb patent litigation involving NPEs.  
According to data from Lex Machina, there has been a sharp decline in the 
number of patent litigation filings since May 2014.204  There were just 387 
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new cases in May 2014 compared to 502 cases in May 2013, which 
roughly amounts to a 23% decrease.205  It is no coincidence that Octane 
and Highmark were both decided in late April 2014.  Even more staggering 
is that just 329 patent suits were filed in September 2014 compared to 549 
patent filings in September 2013, which is roughly a 40% decrease.206  This 
strong correlation indicates that Octane and Highmark are likely beginning 
to impact the patent trolls’ business model. 
VII.  ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
While there are emerging signs of improvement in patent troll abuse, 
there is always more to be done.  Even with great victories in Octane and 
Highmark, the war itself is still not over.  So what more can be done?  One 
proffered solution is the previously discussed Innovation Act.207  Another 
alternative, which has already been implemented, involves the recent 
Supreme Court decision, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank 
International.208  With these proposed and implemented solutions in 
motion, this Comment argues that while the Innovation Act and Alice Corp. 
will benefit patent holders in theory, they carry grave consequences that 
outweigh their inherent benefits.  As a result, a bonding requirement is 
actually the best solution to put the patent troll to rest. 
A.  The Consequences of the Innovation Act 
Like Octane, the Innovation Act addresses fee-shifting provisions in 
patent cases.  Unlike Octane, however, the Innovation Act would 
automatically require the losing party to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees 
instead of an award of fees only in exceptional cases.209  Each side bears its 
own attorney’s fees only if the court finds that the non-prevailing party was 
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“‘substantially justified’ or that special circumstances make an award 
unjust.”210  This of course is contrary to the established American Rule, and 
instead aligns itself with the “loser-pays” English rule.211  Under the 
Innovation Act, many perceive that there will be a reduction in the number 
of cases filed, even more so than with awards under Section 285.212  One of 
the effects of this method is that contingency fee plaintiff’s attorneys will 
suffer a significant loss in the form of the other party’s attorney’s fees if 
they are unsuccessful in court.213  Because many patent trolls use 
contingency fee arrangements, their attorneys will be discouraged from 
representing them, knowing the potential for additional, substantial costs.  
Therefore, there would likely be a reduction in the number of NPE claims 
filed.  A “loser-pays” system adopted by the Innovation Act would also 
discourage low-merit, high-damage cases.214  Patent trolls are notorious for 
bringing dubious and vague claims, as is evidenced by their 8% success 
rate at trial.215 
Despite the positive aspects of the Innovation Act, the consequences 
of adopting such a measure are severe.  One of the dangers associated with 
a loser pays system is that it also impacts patent companies that initiate 
litigation in good faith, not just NPEs.216  For small innovators, there will 
be a reluctance to file a legitimate claim “because they will fear that they 
will lose a lawsuit and end up paying exorbitant costs of the people who 
                                                          
210.  Id. 
 
211.  See Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s Fee 
Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33, 36 (1996) (“In most European countries, civil 
litigation follows the general rule that the losing party pays the winning party’s attorney’s fees, a 
practice that is loosely referred to as the “‘European Rule.’”). 
 
212.  See Liang & Berliner, supra note 207, at 90 (explaining the “British Rule, or two-
way fee shifting, as more effective than the American Rule at reducing the number and cost of 
cases filed.”). 
 
213.  Id. at 93. 
 
214.  Id.   
 
215.  Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 693 (2012). 
 
216.  John Villasenor, ‘Fee-Shifting’ And Patent Reform: A Double-Edged Sword For 
Startup Companies, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2013/12/18/fee-shifting-and-patent-reform-a-double-
edged-sword-for-startup-companies/. 
 
DEFEATING TROLLS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2015  2:08 PM 
346 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3 
they litigated against, even though their claim was legitimate.”217  This 
leaves large patent holders at a substantial advantage in a dispute because 
they are likely to ignore the small company’s claim and increase their 
attorney fees, knowing that the smaller company cannot afford the costs of 
litigation that does not go their way.218 
For an example, take FTB’s CEO Kevin O’Connor, only this time 
imagine he is suing a large corporation, such as Apple, for infringing 
several of FTB’s patents.  FTB engages in discussions with the goal of 
having Apple obtain a licensing agreement to use his patents.  Apple, 
however, would most likely ignore his claim because Apple knows that the 
fee-shifting exposure for FTB would devastate the company.  A loss for 
Apple, however, would only cause a small dent in the company’s massive 
assets.  It seems, though, that if FTB has such a strong claim, he should still 
pursue it against Apple. 
In patent cases, however, the “winners” and “losers” are difficult to 
discern because the merits are not so clear.219  Patent litigation involves 
complex technical and legal issues that are often decided by judges and 
juries with minimal knowledge of patent law.220  Moreover, patent laws are 
“slow to adapt to new technologies that present new fact patterns, which 
adds further uncertainty as to the merits of a patent case.”221  Due to this 
uncertainty, federal appellate courts reverse the district court’s decisions at 
a rate of approximately 30%-40%.222  This situation would not bode well 
for FTB because there is a considerable chance the suit will be wrongly 
decided and fees shifted onto the wrong party. 
Some may argue this situation is unlikely to occur, however, because 
attorney’s fees will not be awarded if the non-prevailing party was 
“substantially justified” in bringing the claim.  Congress, however, has 
repeatedly failed to adequately define the standard when it was first applied 
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in the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980.223  Courts “found it extremely 
difficult to provide any meaningful content for the ‘substantially justified’ 
standard that governs fee-shifting under the Act.”224  The Innovation Act 
adopts this same standard that Congress has yet to properly define.225  This 
vagueness of the “substantial justification” standard has led to inconsistent 
decisions in the courts, which has made the award of attorney’s fees the 
standard rather than the exception.226  Because a large portion of patent 
plaintiffs have “substantial justification” for bringing their case and the 
complexity of technologies in many patent cases, disputes over whether a 
case is “substantially justified” will likely increase litigation costs, which is 
contrary to the Innovation Act’s ultimate goal.227 
The Patent Act’s Section 285 attorney’s fees, as governed by 
Highmark and Octane, is ultimately a better solution than the Innovation 
Act because Section 285 emphasizes the substance of the infringement 
claim rather than focusing on the winners and losers of the case.228  
Determining whether a claim is frivolous involves addressing the lack of 
merit, not necessarily who prevailed, and “attempts to single out a class of 
patent owners will devalue patents, reduce the ability of patent owners to 
realize a return on their investment, and ultimately decrease the incentives 
to innovate.”229  Therefore, Section 285 under Octane and Highmark is a 
better solution because it addresses the merits of the claim itself, while 
maintaining an even playing field between big and small innovators. 
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B.  The Unintended Consequences of Alice Corp. 
Many argue that the recent Supreme Court decision in Alice Corp. 
Pty. v. CLS Bank International presents another, more effective solution to 
the patent troll problem than that offered in Octane and Highmark.230  In 
Alice Corp., the Supreme Court addressed the main issue of whether 
“computer-implemented” inventions “are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 
101, or are instead drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea.”231  Alice 
Corporation was the holder of several patents, one of which included a 
computer-implemented scheme for mitigating settlement risk.232  CLS 
Bank was an operator of a global network that facilitates currency 
transactions.233  CLS Bank filed suit against Alice Corp., seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the computer-implemented scheme patent was 
invalid.234  Alice Corp. counterclaimed, alleging infringement by CLS 
Bank.235  Ultimately the court held that “the claims at issue [were] drawn to 
the abstract idea of intermediated settlement,” and that “merely requir[ing] 
generic computer implementation fail[ed] to transform that abstract idea 
into a patent-eligible invention.”236 
The holding in Alice Corp. discourages patent trolls from filing 
claims because it changes the underlying conditions of their business 
model.237  Patent trolls thrive in the software sector because their patents 
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involve software patents of dubious quality.238  With the ruling in Alice 
Corp., parties dealing with those various patents now have a “very 
important tool to fight back by invalidating those patents.”239  Moreover, 
the ruling will “help prevent dubious patents from being granted in the 
future” to patent trolls.240 
While the Supreme Court struck down abstract software patents, it 
failed to define exactly what constitutes an “abstract idea.” 241  The 
Supreme Court failed to even address what, if anything, about software 
should be considered an “abstract idea.”242  Justice Clarence Thomas, 
writing for the majority, explained that the Court “need not labor to delimit 
the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”243  By 
failing to define an abstract idea, however, the Court left the door open for 
patents trolls to prey on this ambiguity.  The White House’s Council of 
Economic Advisors Report previously mentioned found that “a key factor 
in the rise of patent assertion by non-practicing entities . . . was a change in 
law or technology that led to uncertainty about whether a patent had been 
infringed.”244  The Supreme Court’s failure to define “abstract” in Alice 
Corp. will leave a product-producing company unable to determine if a 
NPE’s patents are valid, causing the company not to risk litigation.  The 
Alice Corp. decision, therefore, created an effect opposite to that intended 
by the Supreme Court.  Moreover, product-producing software companies 
are now left wondering if their patents are even valid.  For Google, Oracle, 
and Microsoft, over half of their patent portfolios are software based.245  
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With the ruling in Alice Corp., hundreds of thousands of software patents 
are potentially at risk.  The rulings in Octane and Highmark, however, do 
not pose these issues because they attack the plaintiff’s purpose for 
bringing the claim and not the underlying nature of the patent.  Therefore, 
Octane and Highmark serve as a better solution than Alice Corp.. 
C.  The Bonding Requirement 
Although Octane and Highmark currently pose a critical threat to 
patent trolls, an additional bonding requirement would supply a 
complimentary solution to these two decisions that would effectively end 
NPE litigation.  A bonding requirement would require a plaintiff to post a 
bond before bringing a patent infringement claim.246  This requirement 
would force a NPE plaintiff to carefully consider the merits of their claim 
rather than filing for nuisance purposes.247  Moreover, a bonding 
requirement would solve the problem of patent trolls functioning as shell 
corporations, which are often set up by patent trolls to avoid paying a 
judgment.248  In the event of an unfavorable judgment, a patent troll simply 
declares bankruptcy and vanishes, leaving the defendant “empty-
handed.”249  With a bonding requirement, however, a defendant would still 
be rightfully paid. 
Bonding requirements have also been effectively imposed in other 
legal fields.250  Under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
movant must post a bond before a court can issue a preliminarily injunction 
or temporary restraining order against the party to be enjoined.251  The 
purpose, much like in the context of patent litigation, is to ensure that the 
enjoined party receives compensation to cover the costs and damages in the 
event the court later rules an injunction was not proper.252  Along with a 
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remedial benefit, a bonding requirement would force abusive NPEs to “put 
some skin in the game.”253 
Congress has also embraced the benefits of a bonding requirement 
with its revision of the SHIELD Act.254  In 2013, U.S. Representatives 
Jason Chaffetz and Peter DeFazio introduced a revision of the SHIELD 
Act, which included a “carefully drafted” bonding requirement.255  Only 
time will tell, however, if the Act becomes reality. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Abusive patent litigation brought by patent trolls poses a serious 
threat to our economy.  Not only do the actions of patent trolls result in 
billions of dollars of lost wealth, this lost wealth reduces spending on 
innovative technology.256  Moreover, these patent trolls use valuable court 
resources to litigate claims that are statically proven to lose.257  Fortunately, 
the Supreme Court has decided to challenge this looming threat and fight 
back with their decision in Octane and Highmark.  Not only do Octane and 
Highmark make it easier for district court judges to award attorney’s fees 
against patent trolls, they do so without the residual ramifications observed 
in Alice Corp. and the Innovation Act.  Coupled with a bonding 
requirement, product-producing companies, both large and small, will send 
patent trolls back under the bridge and keep them a creature of fairytales. 
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